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INTRODUCTION

Lawrence v. Texas ! was a major victory for the ongoing effort to end
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Lawrence prohibited sodomy laws,
which, whether they applied just to gay people like Texas's law or on their face
applied to everyone, have long been used as a tool for discrimination against
gay people. 2 Lawrence also overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,3 which had been a
t Matthew Coles (B.A. Yale University; J.D. University of California, Hastings
College of the Law) has been the Director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project at the
American Civil Liberties Union since 1995. Thanks to Nan Hunter, James Esseks, Leslie
Cooper, Mark Sexton, Steve Shapiro, Ken Choe, Tamara Lange, and Robert Nakatani.
1.539 U.S. 558, 567, 574-75 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1104-45 (11th Cir. 1997) (involving a
lesbian who had a wedding ceremony with her partner that was subsequently fired from her
job as deputy attorney general because of the possible public perception that she violated the
state's sodomy law); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 591 (Miss. 1999) (denying a
gay father custody because of his presumptive violation of the state's gender neutral sodomy
law); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (dealing with the same situation,
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major obstacle to any constitutional claim involving gay people. Bowers was a
due process case, but many courts read it as dispositive of unrelated
constitutional questions about gay people. Most particularly, Bowers was said
to answer questions about both the standard of review and the permissible
justifications for discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 4 It is no
understatement to say that in the 1980s and 1990s, sodomy laws and Bowers v.
Hardwick were the primary legal obstacles to progress in the fight for equality
for gay people.
Important as all this is, fairly applied, Lawrence is likely to be at least as
important for what it brings to constitutional law as it is for what it removes.
Lawrence reestablishes a critical substantive due process principle that Bowers
had put in doubt-the principle that while history is a crucial (perhaps the
crucial) guide to the contours of what rights are implicitly protected by due
process, it is not a guide to who gets to exercise those rights.
Second, and equally important, Lawrence is an important step in the
refinement of due process analysis. The structure of two rigid "tests," one
deferential to the government (rational basis review) and one almost impossible
for the government to meet (strict scrutiny), is slowly but surely giving way to
a more sophisticated approach. That approach will generate an analysis that
will likely take into account not just whether a right is basic, or, to use the old
terminology, "fundamental," but how seriously the government is interfering
with that right. It will look not only at what the government's interests are, but
also at whether they are truly and carefully advanced by what the government
wants to do. Ultimately, the Court will judge the constitutionality of what the
government does with a balancing test-a test that will not only give the
government room to regulate, but that will also demand more than speculation
about what such regulation will do. That kind of approach could significantly
improve the protection of individual rights.
Today, laws that truly do limit implicit rights are too often treated as if
they had no impact on a constitutional right at all. That treatment arises because
courts recognize that if they hold that a law involves a fundamental right, the
result is a form of analysis-strict scrutiny-which virtually no law can
survive. If you apply strict scrutiny to every law that has an impact on a right,
many laws that are aimed at important government interests, and not at
suppressing rights, will be struck down. Courts avoid the test by saying the
right is not "directly" or "significantly" burdened. Under a rigid two-tier
system, the consequence of not subjecting a law to strict scrutiny is that even

but involving a lesbian mother); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1983) (dealing with
the same situation, but with a gay father); see also Diana Hassel, The Use of Sodomy Laws in
Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 813, 829-43 (2001).
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 576 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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though the law does impact a protected right, it receives what amounts to no
real review at all-traditional rational basis review. But if courts had a
meaningful balancing test-a test that allowed them to examine whether the
law in fact was aimed at a legitimate purpose, and how seriously it would
impact the right-they could and likely would use it with laws that entirely
escape real review now. Thus, in the long run, a more sensitive balancing
review is likely to provide far more protection to implicit rights than does the
current structure.
Lawrence is an important step in the refinement of due process analysis
because it is the first case to bring the doctrine that has supported careful due
process review of implicit rights-the fundamental rights doctrine-together
with the due process balancing cases, which look more closely at both
individual and government interests than do the fundamental rights cases. But
Lawrence, like many groundbreaking Supreme Court cases, does not announce
its refinement of due process analysis; it does not even announce in so many
words the kind of due process analysis it uses. And Lawrence does not discuss
the proper role of history in due process much at all. Part I of this Article will
explain just why the Court held that the Texas law violated the Due Process
Clause and will show how the Court's explanation of its holding draws on both
"fundamental rights" cases and due process balancing cases. From there, Part II
analyzes how Lawrence is part of the development of a more sophisticated
doctrine of implicit rights due process. Finally, Part III discusses how the Court
restores the proper role of history in that doctrine.
I.

THE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS USED IN LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

5

A. The Scheme of Substantive Due Process Analysis
The conventional wisdom is that government rules that sufficiently
interfere with a "fundamental right" implicitly protected by the Due Process
Clause call for strict scrutiny. In the classic formulation, that means the law
will be upheld only if it is "necessary" to achieve a compelling interest and is
"narrowly tailored" to that end. 6 All other cases receive a rational basis test.

5. At various points, substantive due process, particularly when it is used to protect

implicit rights, has had such a shady constitutional reputation that the best place to start
might be with a defense of its legitimacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293-4 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). In my mind, substantive due process is nothing more or less than insisting on
the rule of law in the legislative process.
6. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Sometimes "necessity" disappears, and
sometimes the idea merges with "narrow tailoring," although these are two distinct ideasthat the law should be the only way to vindicate the state's important interest and that it
should be designed, as much as possible, to do no more than that.
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Laws subject to the rational basis test carry a presumption of constitutionality
and will be upheld as long as a rational legislator could think they would
promote some legitimate aim. The aim need not be the real aim of the law, and
there need be no evidence that the law will actually work toward this aim as
7
long as one could "rationally" think that it might.
At their core, both tests ask the same question: what is the connection
between the regulation and a constitutionally permissible government purpose?
Strict scrutiny asks the question in a way that makes it very difficult for the
government to win; the state must prove that the law is essential to a very
important goal. Conversely, rational basis asks the question in a way that makes
it difficult for the challenger to win.
There is, however, a third group of substantive due process cases that
considers the same connection question in a distinctly less loaded and more
careful way. These decisions say that the Court's job is to "balance" the state's
interest in regulation against the individual's interest in freedom, and to look at
both interests in greater detail than the two other groups of due process cases
typically do. The best of these cases look not just at the state's interest, but also
at the state's ability to show that the interest will in fact be significantly
advanced by the regulation and that the regulation is carefully focused on the
goal. They look not only at what the individual's interest is, but also at how
significantly the regulation would limit it. The best of these cases then lay out
fairly detailed standards for striking the balance. For example, in Youngberg v.
Romeo, the Supreme Court held that a mentally disabled man, who was
involuntarily committed by his parent, had protected liberty interests in
"personal security" and "liberty from restraint." 8 According to the Court, to
decide if those liberty interests had been violated, a court would have to
"balance" them against the state's "legitimate" interest in running an
institution. In decisions about restraints on, and protection of, a mentally
disabled man committed to state care, the Court said that due process requires
decisions to be made by qualified mental health professionals. If such
professionals make the decisions, the decisions are "presumptively valid"
unless they are a radical departure from the standards in the field. 9
In these balancing cases, the Court typically talks about "protected liberty"
instead of "fundamental rights." These "protected liberty" cases rarely refer to
"fundamental rights" cases, and vice versa. These two strands of substantive
due process seem almost to stand apart from each other. In fact, some judges

7. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602 (1993).
8. 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 320-24 (1982); see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
178-79 (2003) (finding "a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 'avoiding involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs'-an interest that only an 'essential' or 'overriding'
state interest might overcome" (internal citations omitted)).
9. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16, 320-24; Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.

2005]

LAWRENCE & SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

seem completely unaware of the balancing cases.10 But Youngberg is hardly an
isolated case. The Court has used the same "protected liberty" analysis in cases
involving the right to refuse medication or life-sustaining nourishment and, to
an extent, in cases involving abortion. In the abortion cases in particular, the
Court began to suggest that we should think of all substantive due process cases
involving implicit rights as "protected liberty" cases. Something like the old
strict scrutiny analysis should be used when the government attempts to
completely prohibit the exercise of a protected implicit right. A less exacting
balancing test applies to less severe intrusions on the rights that are driven by
legitimate government concerns. I'
B. The Lawrence Holding & its Terminology: Rational Basis, Strict Scrutiny,
or Protected Liberty?
In terms of doctrinal meaning, the most important elements in a case are
how the Court actually rules on the precise issue before it and how it explains
what it does. There are at least two passages in which the Lawrence Court
makes a square holding, actually striking down the Texas law. The one that
most clearly strikes down the Texas law reads as follows: "The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
12
personal and private life of the individual."
Several judges have pointed to the word "legitimate" and, noting that the
word "legitimate" is usually part of rational basis terminology, have insisted
that this sentence shows that Lawrence is a rational basis case. These judges go
on to say that Lawrence's failure to use the term "fundamental right" confirms
13
that it must be a rational basis case.
It is certainly true that the Lawrence opinion does not use the term
"fundamental right" (although the Court gets close a few times), 14 and that it
says Texas cannot justify its intrusion into the "personal and private" life of the
individual with a "legitimate interest," instead of saying that the intrusion is not
justified by a "compelling interest." One ought to be careful, though, about
attaching too much significance to particular words; the Court has hardly been
rigid with its terminology, even in strict scrutiny cases. For example, while

10. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia and Judge Birch of the 1 th
Circuit insist that "rational basis" and "fundamental rights, strict scrutiny" are the only two
forms of substantive due process analysis. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-94
(2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804, 816 (11 th Cir. 2004).
11. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 166; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
13. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, 599 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Lofton, 358
F.3d at 816; Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
14. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565-66.
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Justice Douglas's lead opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut15 says a "zone of
privacy" is created by "several fundamental constitutional guarantees," it never
says the "right of privacy" itself is "fundamental." In fact, it refers to it as
"legitimate."' 16 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court struck down a Washington
"grandparent visitation" law as an "unconstitutional" interference with the
"fundamental right of parents to make decisions" about visitation. 17 In doing
so, the Court never mentioned "compelling"--or even "legitimate"-interests,
"narrow tailoring," or even "strict scrutiny." It just said that the law gave
insufficient "deference" to the parents' views. 18 There are many other examples
of the Court not using traditional strict scrutiny terminology under the Due
Process Clause and under other strict scrutiny tests. 19
Still, Lawrence arguably does not read as a traditional strict scrutiny case.
It would be, at the least, odd for the Court to decide a "fundamental rights"

strict scrutiny case without ever using either of those terms or referring to
"compelling interests" or "narrow tailoring." And it would not have been a
doctrinal stretch for the Court to have held that the Texas law was
unconstitutional because the only interests the state could offer for it were not

legitimate.

The "morality"

justification Texas offered was

not moral

disapproval of sodomy. Sodomy was perfectly acceptable when practiced by
ninety to ninety-six percent of Texans (depending on whose estimate of the gay
population you adopt). 20 For Texas, sodomy-not the classic definition, but

15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 485. Justice Goldberg, writing for Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and
himself, joins the lead opinion, but in his concurrence he uses the term "fundamental right."
Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J.). Justices White and Harlan, concurring in the result but not in the
lead opinion, do not. They instead talk about protected liberty. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J.,
concurring), 502-07 (White, J., concurring).
17. 530 U.S. 57, 65-70 (2000).
18. Id. Troxel is a plurality opinion. Justice Souter, who concurred in the judgment,
also said the law was unconstitutional without using any of the terminology of strict scrutiny.
Justice Thomas objected to the failure of the plurality and Justice Souter to articulate a test.
He said that he would apply strict scrutiny and said that the statute would fail for lack of a
"legitimate" government interest. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). To be fair to Justice
Thomas, he acknowledged that the test usually requires a compelling interest and said it
lacked a legitimate one to make a rhetorical point about how weak the state's case was. But
one could say much the same thing for the Court's opinion in Lawrence. To say that a state
does not have a legitimate interest that would outweigh that of the individual is to say that it
could not possibly have a compelling one. That is not the same thing as saying an interest
that was legitimate but not compelling would be sufficient.
19. See, for example, the confusing and at times contradictory rhetoric in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), outlined infra note 42. See also Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("To characterize the quality
of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of
descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.").
20. Although Alfred Kinsey never said 10% of the population was gay, he is widely
said to have said it-this, for the purposes of popular culture, is probably better than actually
having said it. Most scholars in the field think three to five percent is a better estimate. See S.
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oral as well as anal sex-was not wrong in itself. It was wrong only when
performed by same-sex couples. Under the circumstances, Texas could not
claim that it sought to discourage sodomy by disadvantaging those who
perform it. It could say only that it sought to disadvantage a small portion of the
people who might engage in it: gay people.
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Lawrence,
the most basic principle of equal protection is that the government cannot
classify a group of citizens in order to disadvantage them.2 1 To do that would
be, as the Court put it in Romer v. Evans, "a classification of persons
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not
permit."'22 Saying that you want to disadvantage a group because you
disapprove of them, even on a "moral" basis does not help. When the state
discriminates against a group of citizens because it does not like the group, it
usually says that its dislike is justified by "morality." "Morality" has been used
to justify discrimination based on race, sex, and mental disability and has also
been used against "hippies."'23 As Justice O'Connor summed it up, moral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the
Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be "drawn for
24
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."
Since Texas essentially had nothing other than its "moral disapproval" of
gay people to support the law, 25 the Court could easily have based its decision
in Lawrence on this well-established equal protection rule against allowing a
classification to be its justification. And it probably could have made much the
same ruling under due process, since dislike or fear of persons is probably not a
legitimate purpose in due process analysis.
Just as it would have been odd for the Court to decide a strict scrutiny case

Michaels, The Prevalence of Homosexuality in the United States, in TEXTBOOK OF
HOMOSEXUALITY AND MENTAL HEALTH (Robert P. Cabaj & Terry S. Stein eds., 1996).
21. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 635 (1996); United States Dep't. of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
22. 517 U.S. at 635. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this rule against accepting a
classification as its own justification follows directly from the central idea of equality itself.
See Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (concerning a trial judge who
sentenced a couple to prison for interracial marriage under "moral" justification that God
separated the races); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(upholding refusal to admit women to practice law on basis of "divine ordinance"); Moreno
v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972) (involving the denial of federal
assistance to communes in an attempt to advance morality by combating unconventional
living arrangements); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279,
294 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dealing with mentally disabled treated as criminals); see also Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926) (involving state sterilization law for insane inmates).
24. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; see also Respondent's Brief at 26-27, 42-48, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
25. Id.
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without using the conventional terminology, it would be odd for the Court to
decide a rational basis, "minimum scrutiny" case without ever using either of
those terms or the words "arbitrary" or "irrational" or referring to a "strong
presumption of validity." But none of those words appears in Lawrence
either. 26 The key is to get back to what Lawrence does say. Again, the crucial
sentence striking down the Texas law says, "The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual. '27
The key here is not the word "legitimate," but the word "justify." Instead
of saying that Texas's interests were not legitimate, the Court said the law
furthered no legitimate state interest that was sufficient to "justify" the
"intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. '28 Traditional
rational basis asks not if the government's interest is sufficient to justify the
limitation on the individual; it asks merely if one could think the law might
achieve a legitimate purpose. 29 No attention whatsoever is paid to the interest
of the individual. Even under "rational basis with bite," a form of analysis that
may or may not exist in equal protection (and so may or may not exist in due
process) the issue would be whether, in fact, the law has some real connection
to the state's interest. 30 Assessing whether the state's interest is significant
enough to vindicate what the state has done-balancing the state's interest
against that of the individual-is not rational basis review. It is, however,
typical of protected liberty cases; so is the terminology the Court uses.
The language problem in Lawrence is not with the Court, but with its
critics. Lawrence fails to use the words of established due process analysis only
if one accepts Justice Scalia's insistence that all substantive due process cases
are either "fundamental rights," strict scrutiny, or rational basis. 3 1 But the
"protected liberty" line of substantive due process cases uses neither the
language of strict scrutiny nor rational basis. Those cases do discuss "protected

26. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)

(rejecting a due process challenge under a rational basis test, noting that the "legislature
might have concluded" that the challenged statute furthered various legitimate interests).
30. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Forward-In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Professor

Gunther's idea was that the Supreme Court was evolving a model of equal protection in
which even the most deferential form of review would be based not on speculation, but on
evidence about purposes and connection.
31. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 591-94. It is interesting that while Justice Scalia invokes
many cases in support of his point that "fundamental rights" must be given strict scrutiny, he
offers nothing in support of the critical proposition that completes his system-that all other
substantive due process cases are rational basis cases. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593. Justice
Scalia never mentions the "protected liberty" cases at all.
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liberty," and "legitimate" or "important" state interests, and they explicitly
balance the government's interests against those of the individual. Those cases,
in short, use much the same terminology as Lawrence, and balance the parties'
interests in much the same way that Lawrence does. But Lawrence does not fit
neatly into the "protected liberty" line of cases either.
C. The Court's Explanation in Lawrence: Rational Basis, Strict Scrutiny, or
Protected Liberty?
As I said before, there are two passages in which the Lawrence Court
makes a square holding. In the second, Lawrence overrules Bowers v.
Hardwick,32 which it had to do in order to strike down the Texas law.
Lawrence overruled Bowers with these four sentences: "Justice Stevens'
analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should
control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be
'33
and now is overruled."
In this passage, the Court tells us not just what it holds about Bowers-that
it was wrong when it was decided and is wrong now-but why: Justice
Stevens's analysis in his Bowers dissent "should control here."'34 It explains not
only why Bowers was wrong, but why the Court reaches the opposite result in
Lawrence.
Just before saying that Justice Stevens's analysis should have been
controlling in Bowers, the Court quotes part of his analysis. In the quoted
passage, Stevens says that "prior cases" make "two propositions abundantly
clear."'35 First, the cases establish that the belief of a majority of people that a
practice is immoral is not enough to uphold a law banning it. For that principle,
Justice Stevens relies on Loving v. Virginia, the decision that struck down
Virginia's law against interracial marriage. 36 The Loving decision rested on
two independent constitutional grounds. The Court held that the law violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it categorized couples by race. 37 Apart
from that, the Court held that the law violated the Due Process Clause by
restricting access to the fundamental right to marry. 38 For our purposes, the
critical point is that Stevens rests the first of his two-point analysis on a case
with two holdings: one, a strict scrutiny equal protection holding, and the other,

32. 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986), overruledby Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
34. Id.
35. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-12.
38. Id. at 12.
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39
a strict scrutiny due process holding.
In the passage quoted by the Lawrence opinion, Stevens goes on to say that
the other point established by prior cases is that decisions made by married
couples about "the intimacies of their physical relationship" are protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 For that principle,

Stevens relies on Griswold v. Connecticut, which used strict scrutiny to strike
down a ban on the use of contraceptives. 4 1 Stevens goes on to point out that
under Carey v. PopulationServices42 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 3 that protection
applies to unmarried couples as well. 44
All of the due process cases on which Justice Stevens relied are strict
scrutiny cases. 45 Thus, the "controlling" analysis which required that Lawrence
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick is based on strict scrutiny due process. Those who
see Lawrence as a rational basis case argues that despite all this, Lawrence
cannot be a strict scrutiny case because it fails to include an evaluation of
whether the right it enforces is firmly rooted in American history and tradition.
After the Court's decision in Washington v. Glucksberg,4 6 the critics say, only
rights that are "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" qualify for
47
any form of "heightened scrutiny."
It is a pity that the Lawrence decision does not address this objection
directly, as there are several good responses. The right of two adults to decide
how they will be sexually intimate is "deeply rooted" in American history and
tradition. As the American Civil Liberties Union, the Cato Institute, and a
group of history professors led by George Chauncey all argued to the Court in

39. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
43. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
44. Id. There is room for a little argument about whether Griswold is truly a strict
scrutiny case, a protected liberty case, or something of a mix. Justice Douglas's opinion for
the Court uses something like a "narrowly tailored" analysis to strike the law down, but he
never speaks of compelling interests. Griswold, 381 U.S at 485. Justice Goldberg, writing for
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and himself, uses the language of traditional strict
scrutiny. Id. at 497-98. Justice White's words are maddeningly confusing. When he speaks
of what the Constitution requires of the state, he says the interest must be "compelling."
When he speaks of what it will take for the state to meet the test, he speaks of a "legitimate
and substantial interest" and a law which is not "arbitrary and capricious," pretty well rolling
the rhetoric of strict scrutiny and rational basis together. Id. at 504. Justice Harlan
incorporates his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961), to explain his view. In
Poe, he says that a "rational basis" would not be enough to uphold the law and that he thinks
the state itself does not think its interest is "very important" or the means used to effectuate it
"appropriate or necessary." Poe, 367 U.S. at 554.
45. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438, is an equal protection case.
46. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-93 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 (2004).
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Lawrence, American history shows that while many, perhaps even most, forms
of mutual non-procreative sex were prohibited by the law everywhere in the
4
United States, people were virtually never prosecuted for it. 8
The Lawrence Court used this evidence to demolish the claim made in
Bowers that the existence of laws against non-procreative sexuality foreclosed
any claim that it was protected by the Due Process Clause. But Lawrence did
not say that the virtually uniform failure to use the laws against adult couples in
fact demonstrated that their private behavior was beyond the reach of the law.
Justice Scalia says non-enforcement could not be the basis for finding that there
is a history and tradition of leaving alone adults who want to be together in the
bedroom. 4 9 But why not? 50 The consistent refusal of a society to invoke a law
against some of the conduct to which it facially applies powerfully suggests a
consensus that this conduct is off limits. 5 1 Laws against battery-any harmful
touching, no matter how slight-contain no exception for mild or moderate
corporal punishment inflicted on children by their parents. Does it follow that
the fundamental right to raise children does not include the right to administer
physical punishment? Or does it instead follow that it is so well understood that
the right does include the right to physical punishment that no statutory
exception has ever been thought necessary?
The nonuse of the sodomy laws did not "occur" in a vacuum. The "hands
off' treatment of adults at home in post-Revolutionary America reflects a
widespread, fervent belief that the government had no place in the home and, in
particular, no place in the bedroom. 52 Justice Scalia would like to have the
Court say that only those rights that have historically been protected by positive
law are fundamental. This view is a critical part of his long-running campaign
to bring substantive due process back to its Lochner era roots by making it a
break against change in the law. 53 But the Court has steadfastly refused to go
along with Justice Scalia's analysis-statutory law is not the only important
54
tradition from which we derive fundamental rights.
While the Lawrence Court probably could have shown that the right of
adults to decide how to be sexually intimate is "deeply rooted" in American
48. Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute, Lawrence (No.
02-102); Brief of Amicus Curiae History Professors, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. The suggestion that the laws were not enforced because it was impossible to find
evidence of violations will not hold up. Remorseful, angry, and spiteful co-participants are
always a possibility, as are the prying neighbors who could certainly provide "probable
cause." See, e.g., JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 27, 29 (1988).

51. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 50.
53. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). This is a longer

discussion for another day.
54. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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history and tradition, the Court was right not to do so. The Lawrence Court did
not find a new constitutional right; it simply applied a right it had protected
long ago to a new context. And the application of an existing due process right
to a new situation does not require a new "history and tradition" analysis.
When the Court in Troxel decided whether a judge could overrule the
decision of a fit parent about when a child would see her grandparents, it did no
historical analysis to see if the traditional right to raise children included a right
not to be second-guessed by courts on decisions about visitation with
grandparents-a question it had never answered before. 5 5 When the Court
decided that the "fundamental right to marry" applied to prisoners, it did no
new historical analysis, even though it had never decided if the right applied in
prison before. 5 6 When the Court decided that the fundamental right to
"personal choice in matters of marriage and family life" included the right of
a
woman to live with her son, his child, and the son of another of her children, it
did no new historical analysis, even though it had never decided if the right to
family life included the right of grandchildren who were cousins to live with
their grandmother. 57 No new right; no new analysis.
The Court in Lawrence is rather clear that it does not see itself describing a
new right. It says the "most pertinent beginning point" for its analysis is its
1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.58 After a short paragraph describing
the case, it sums up its understanding of what Griswold means in a sentence
describing the holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird:59 "After Griswold it was
established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct
'60
extends beyond the marital relationship."
That sentence telegraphs what the Court will hold expressly a few
paragraphs later: the simmering dispute about whether Griswold is more
properly understood to be about the right of a married couple to decide to have
non-procreative sex or their right to decide not to have childrencontraception-is over. Griswold is about sex and relationships.
That certainly was what the language of Griswold itself seemed to say. The
lead opinion in Griswold spoke of a "relationship" protected by a zone of
privacy. It described the right of privacy as "older than the Bill of Rights" and
then said that "marriage" is "intimate to the degree of being sacred." "It is," the
Court said, "an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions." It was not contraception that was sacred or dedicated to a noble
purpose; it was the relationship of two people who married. The Court asked
rhetorically: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
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marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" The Court
further stated that "[t]he very idea [of a search of the 'sacred precincts' for
evidence] is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding" not contraception,
61
but "the marriage relationship."
The idea that Griswold was about contraception, and not the relationship of
two married adults, was set up, oddly enough, by Eisenstadtv. Baird. In what is
probably dicta in its equal protection decision extending the Griswold right to
unmarried couples, the Court famously said, "If the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
'62
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Note the Court did not say the right involved was the right to be free from
interference with decisions about childbearing. It said it was the right to be free
from "intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person" as the
decision to have children. It cited three cases. Skinner v. Oklahoma 63 addressed
a state's power to take away the ability to decide to have children. Stanley v.
Georgia64 and Jacobson v. Massachusetts,65 while about privacy, did not.
Eisenstadt held that contraception for everyone was included in the Griswold
right. It did not say that was the entire scope of the right.
In what was probably an effort to prevent Griswold from being read
narrowly to apply only to people who were married or in marriage-like
66
relationships, the Court insisted in Carey v. PopulationServices International
that the right covered decisions about childbearing generally, relying on
Eisenstadt. That description was then used in Bowers v. Hardwick to suggest
that Griswold, Eisenstadt,and Carey were only about childbearing. 67 That does
not make much sense as an interpretation of Griswold. After all, Connecticut
did not say (at least, not in this particular law) that married couples had to have
children or that they could not decide not to have children. The state only said
that married couples could not have sexual intercourse unless it was aimed at,

61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). The lead opinion was not
alone. Justice Goldberg, concurring with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
described the right as protecting "marital privacy," not contraception, and said Connecticut's
law interfered with "a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy-that of the
marital relation and the marital home." Id. at 486-87, 495 (Goldberg, J.,concurring). Justice
Goldberg, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), and Justice Harlan's
famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961), said due process protected a
"private realm of family life." Id. at 495.
62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
63. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
64. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down a criminal conviction for possession of
pornography).
65. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding forced vaccination).
66. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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or at least took the risk of, procreation. Connecticut did not mandate
childbearing; it limited sexual intercourse.
But to understand Griswold as a case about sexual intercourse is also to
miss the point. As the Griswold court itself said, the problem was policing the
"sacred precincts" of the "marital bedroom." The vice in the Connecticut law in
Griswold lay in its attempt to police "a coming together" of two people,
"hopefully enduring" and "intimate to the degree of being sacred," an
"association" for a "noble purpose." '68
A very similar failure to get the point was the problem with Bowers.
Bowers, the Lawrence Court tells us, "failed to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake." Bowers was no more about a "right to engage in certain sexual
conduct," Lawrence insists, than a case about a married couple-like
Griswold-could properly be said to be "about the right to have sexual
intercourse." '69 The intimate relationship of two adults who decide to
participate in "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior" is the thing
the law protects. 70 The laws involved in Bowers and Lawrence, the Lawrence
Court tells us-like the law involved in Griswold-"purportto do no more than
prohibit a particular sexual act." But, in fact, they "seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
'7 1
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals."
Griswold, broadened by Eisenstadt and Carey and reaffirmed by Casey,
says that the Constitution protects the relationship of two adults who are
sexually intimate and limits the power of the state to interfere with the conduct
that is a part of that intimacy. 72 What is at stake in Lawrence, then, is not
whether the court will read the federal Constitution to "confer" a new
"fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."'73 It is whether
gay people have the same right to intimate relationships recognized in
Griswold. The answer, quite simply, is yes.
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter into this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
74
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.
Putting together what the Court says, gay people have the right to choose

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
539 U.S.
74.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-68 (2003).
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id. at 564-67.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
558 (2003).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.

2005]

LAWRENCE & SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

("this choice") to enter personal relationships ("this relationship") in which the
"most private human conduct, sexual behavior," occurs. 75 That relationship,
which is what the laws of Texas and Georgia "[sought] to control," is protected
by the Constitution, for gay people just as it is for heterosexuals, just as it is at
its root for married couples. I am not saying that it wasn't possible to write
Lawrence in a way that would have walked us through the doctrine more
simply. But taken at its words, the meaning of the Lawrence opinion is clear
enough. People have the right to form intimate relationships involving sex.
That is not a new right; the Supreme Court recognized it forty years ago in
Griswold. Gay people have that right as much as anyone else.
II. REFINING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Toward a More Sophisticated Substantive Due Process Analysis
If Lawrence is based on the same fundamental right that Griswold found,
we are still left with something of a puzzle. Why, in this brilliantly rich
opinion, does the Court use "protected liberty" rhetoric to describe the right at
issue and use "protected liberty" balancing analysis to decide the outcome,
while invoking "fundamental rights" case law and holding that a "fundamental
rights" analysis from another case (Stevens's dissent in Bowers) is
"controlling"?
I suspect that the Court is in the process of collapsing the two lines of case
law into one. For some time, the Court has been dissatisfied with the relatively
inflexible doctrine it created for both due process and equal protection. Both
systems have a lower standard "deferential" in name, but most of the time,
despite the Court's occasional insistence to the contrary, this standard is pretty
toothless in fact. While lower level equal protection review at least has a few
tools to root out real inequality in contexts that are not suspect, minimum
scrutiny due process really does not. The upper standard under both systems, as
Gerald Gunther said, is notoriously "strict" in theory but fatal in fact. The
middle tier under equal protection neutralized the adjectives so that it is not
clear at the start who will win, but has failed to develop much to explain in a
principled way how it is supposed to work. And it has not seemed to work so
well.

76

The "protected liberty" due process cases, on the other hand, have been
more sophisticated from the start. In Youngberg v. Romeo, for example, the

75. Id.
76. See Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (holding that the rational basis test
is not a toothless one); Gerald Gunther, Forward-In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). For a
good example of the perilous nature of middle tier equal protection review, see Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). I find plausible the classification/purpose connection of which
the Court is so skeptical.
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Court said it did not want to simply leave balancing individual interests against
the state's interests to the "unguided discretion" of lower courts. 77 In assessing
the individual interest at stake, the Court said that a committed individual's
interest in freedom from restraint and in personal safety were somewhat in
tension. In evaluating the state's interest, the Court took into account the
difficulties of running a state home for people who are mentally ill. Out of
those two inquiries, the Court put together a rather specific set of balancing
rules: judgments about restraint have to be made by medical professionals; so
long as they are, they are entitled to a "presumption of correctness," subject to
being overturned only if the decision was a "substantial departure from
78
accepted professional judgment."
Just a few days before it handed down its decision in Lawrence, the Court
decided another "protected liberty" case, Sell v. United States. 79 In Sell, the
Court set out standards for deciding when a person can be forced to take antipsychotropic drugs in order to stand trial. Sell lays out a four-part analysis that
focuses the Court's evaluation on individual and state interests. First, the Court
has to look closely at the state's interest. The state has a legitimate interest in
prosecution, but if the crime did not involve violence, it may not be quite so
compelling. If the result of refusing the drugs is a long incarceration, that may
diminish the state's interest in prosecuting a criminal case as well. Second, the
Court needs to ask if the drugs will really advance the state's interest. Some
drugs could so interfere with perception that a trial would not be fair. Third, the
Court insists that there be no less intrusive alternatives that would achieve the
same results. Finally, the court must decide that the drugs are in the patient's
80
best medical interest, which may depend on the drug.
Sell is the toughest of the Court's three cases on forced administration of
psychotropic drugs. Washington v. Harper,8 1 which involved forced drugging
82
for safety in prison, is the most deferential to the state. Riggins v. Nevada,
which involves drugging so that a defendant could stand trial for murder, sets
up a tougher standard than Harperdoes, but not one as tough as that of Sell. In
Harper, the Court is clearly more deferential because there is a safety-to-self
issue, which somewhat compromises the individual interest in refusing the
drug, and because of the prison context, which gives the state significantly

77. 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).

78. Id. at 321-22, 324. I admit Youngberg is a somewhat arbitrary place to begin; the
due process "freedom from restraint" idea can be traced further back.
79. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
80. See id. at 179-82. Interestingly, although Sell was decided just 10 days before
Lawrence, and although it plainly uses the Court's "protected liberty" due process analysis,
Justice Scalia dissents only on the basis that the underlying decision was not final. He does
not insist, as he does in Lawrence, that there is no "protected liberty" due process analysis
and that all substantive due process cases are either strict scrutiny or rational basis decisions.
81. 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
82. 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992).
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more power. 83 Sell is clearly less deferential than Riggins because it thinks the
charges-which stem from fraudulent medical claims as opposed to murderand the fact that refusing the drug may result in longer incarceration, reduce the
84
state's interest.
Youngberg, Harper,Riggins, and Sell remind me of the Court's approach
to free expression. It has always seemed that at the core, most First Amendment
cases turn on the Court's examination of four things: the way the government is
attempting to limit expression (viewpoint, content, secondary effect, etc.); the
extent to which expression will be seriously curtailed (prior restraint, criminal
conviction, chilling effect, time and place); the importance of the government's
interest; and the extent to which the government needs the limitation it seeks to
achieve its aim. Looking again and again at groups of similar cases, the Court
has evolved quite a few refined First Amendment balancing analyses: clear and
present danger; compelling interest (in its somewhat different content and
viewpoint formulations); the O'Brien test; and the time, place, and manner test,
85
for example.
This may even be a clumsy oversimplification of freedom of expression
analysis. Nonetheless, it offers a far richer analytic framework than the rigid
three-tier equal protection system and the even more rigid two-tier due process
analysis Justice Scalia advocates. Under the First Amendment, we look with
much more care both at the ways individuals are affected by state regulation
and at the state's asserted need for the regulation and its care in crafting it. Free
expression is the most mature body of rights law, so it makes sense that it
would be the most sophisticated. But it also makes sense that equal protection
and due process ought to evolve toward a more sophisticated approach. Equal
protection analysis, for example, ought to have the capacity to evaluate
government actions that violate the central concept of equality outside the
context of historically suspect classifications. Due process analysis, for
example, ought to have the capacity to evaluate government actions that put
real disincentives on a protected activity without treating them either as if they
were an outright ban or of no significance to the protected right at all. That kind
of evolution, it seems to me, is just what the Court has been working toward.
Lawrence was not the first time the Court used the language of "protected
liberty" in a case not involving forced medication of someone in state custody.
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health described the right involved thereto refuse life sustaining nourishment-as a "protected liberty interest" under
the Due Process Clause, a right evaluated by "balancing" the individual's
83. Harper,494 U.S. at 223.
84. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-182. Sell has its problems analytically. While the Court
explains how to figure out when the state can forcibly medicate, it never discusses why this
framework is required by the Due Process Clause.
85. Denver Area Cable Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996);
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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interest against those of the state 86 Perhaps more importantly, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court, while saying
that it was reaffirming the central holding of Roe v. Wade, virtually abandoned
"fundamental rights" terminology. "The controlling word in the cases before
us," the Court said near the start of its opinion, "is 'liberty."' From that point
on, the Court framed its decision in terms of "the substantive liberties protected
'87
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Casey decision reaffirms that any attempt by a state to prevent a
woman from terminating a pregnancy before viability would be subject to strict
scrutiny and would be, as the Court candidly admits, struck down. But, the
Court says, some laws aimed at other things which may have an incidental
impact on the ability to end a pregnancy should not have to pass so tough a test.
Moreover, the Court says, the state has a legitimate interest in trying to protect
potential life-an interest that ought to allow it to attempt to dissuade a woman
from having an abortion as long as it is not really trying to block her from
88
obtaining the procedure.
Whatever one thinks of the outcome in Casey, it is a clear attempt at a
more sophisticated approach. It is not just that the state is having an impact on a
woman's bodily integrity that a court should examine-it is the extent to which
the regulation the state proposes would limit a woman's control. A substantial
limitation will trigger the Roe analysis. Something less will not. And while the
state's interest in preserving potential life is not sufficient to allow it to prevent
an abortion, it is strong enough to let the state try to persuade a woman not to
89
abort, as long as it does not actually erect a substantial barrier.
Due process analysis in abortion cases remained rather rigid after Casey;
with "substantial obstacles," or, as the Court calls them, "undue burdens," oldfashioned strict scrutiny applies. 90 Otherwise, the state wins. But Casey does
more than just shift back the line established by Roe. It begins to take account
of the more complex ways in which "protected liberty" questions arise and
refines the approach based on a closer look at the state's interests and the ways
in which the individual's rights are limited. At least in terms of the factors it
takes into account, Casey begins to look more like First Amendment analysis.
Lawrence is the critical next step because it brings the balancing analysis
of "protected liberty" cases into a case that the Court finds to fall squarely
within the "fundamental rights" doctrine. This suggests that the Court would
like to eliminate the term "fundamental right" completely and start speaking of
all "heightened scrutiny" due process cases as cases about "liberty." I suspect

86. 497 U.S. 261, 278-9 (1990); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-49 (1992).
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-49.
88. Id. at 869-877.
89. Id. at 877.
90. Id. at 878.
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that the Court would like to use the balancing approach of the "protected
liberty" cases in all substantive due process cases that involve implicitly
protected rights and ask not only whether a "fundamental right" is implicated
by a case, but also how much the government has focused on the right itself as
the thing it wants to limit and how seriously the right would be limited if the
government were to prevail. I think the Court would like to ask why the
government wants to regulate and be more demanding in terms of both the
importance of the goal and the evidence that the particular means will help
achieve the goal. Like the First Amendment, substantive due process could
develop a series of balancing tests, keeping strict scrutiny and rational basis at
the extremes, while developing a directed but sensitive group of analyses in
between.
An approach like this would go a long way toward solving one of the
persistent problems of the "two-tier," all or nothing approach in substantive due
process: courts, particularly lower courts, often pretend that protected interests
are not involved in cases where they really are. For example, courts treat both
benefit programs that use marriage to determine eligibility and anti-nepotism
cases as not involving enough of a "direct and substantial" burden on the right
to marry to call upon strict scrutiny. 9 1 But there is a vast difference between a
program that uses a relationship in an attempt to make a reasonable assessment
about living arrangements, like the benefit programs do, and one that treats the
protected relationships as a problem. It borders on the absurd to say that antinepotism policies do not have a direct impact on family relationships.
The rigid "two-tier" approach also leaves out what are often the most
important considerations in evaluating the way a policy impacts a protected
interest. It may be that the best argument for the use of family relationships in
benefit plans is that the impact on protected relationships is, at most, incidental.
But it is also significant that the government's interest is completely unrelated
to controlling the protected activity. The best argument for anti-nepotism
policies is probably that relationships do, in some circumstances, interfere with
the smooth functioning of the workplace. The "direct and substantial" line
ignores almost all of this. All of these considerations would be taken into
account in the kind of balancing approach the Court typically does under the
First Amendment.
A sophisticated balancing approach will give greater protection to rights
implicitly protected by due process because it will allow courts to examine
limitations short of outright prohibitions without having always to strike them
down. Such an approach will give greater flexibility to the government to
undertake limited regulation that is not aimed at effectively forbidding the
exercise of the right. If this is where the Court is headed, it makes sense that
Lawrence would use "protected liberty" terminology and balancing interests in

91. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986); Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609
( lIth Cir. 1995).
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a case that is controlled by Griswold strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is now just
one form of due process balancing. 92 But why didn't Lawrence then take a
closer look at the state and individual interests involved?
The answer, I think, is that Texas did not give the Court much with which
to work. Its device-a criminal prohibition that gets used mostly as a civil
disability-is on the heavy-handed end of the spectrum. Its "interest," on the
other hand, could not have been less respectable. While the state said its
interest was the preservation of morality, in the end all it had was the "moral"
view that sexual intimacy is bad when gay people engage in it, but not when
straight people do so. Using the law to express the idea that some people are
immoral, as explained above, is improper. Thus, Lawrence presented state
interference with a core-fundamental, if you will-due process liberty with
nothing in the way of a legitimate, much less compelling, explanation as to
93
why.
If the Court is moving toward a more First Amendment-like analysis for
due process cases, one that uses a strict scrutiny balancing analysis in some
cases, and other balancing approaches for devices which do not intrude so
starkly on core rights and that reflect serious state concerns, Lawrence was not
much of a vehicle for laying out the new approach. It simply was not rich
enough. Under the circumstances, it probably made the most sense to do what
the Court did: reinforce the "liberty" terminology, invoke the existing right that
in fact applied, and do a balance without saying much more.
B. Reestablishing the Proper Role of History in Identifying Protected Liberty
If anything, the Lawrence opinion is even less clear about the second
critical change it makes to due process: restoring the proper role of history in
defining the scope of implicitly protected rights.
While the Court's decisions prior to Bowers v. Hardwick made history and
tradition a-and perhaps the-critical factor in deciding what interests are
protected by the Due Process Clause, it never accepted traditional restrictions
on who was able to exercise the rights that history identified. On the contrary,
many of the Court's important due process liberty decisions could not have
been decided as they were had the Court restricted the rights it identifies
through history to those who had the historical right to exercise them.
At common law, a child born out of wedlock was "nullis fillius, the son
[sic] of no one."' 94 Most American states changed that, so that "illegitimates"
were the children of their mothers. They were not, however, the children of

92. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563-64, 576-78 (2003).
93. Respondent's Brief at 26-7, 42-8, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-

102).
94. Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153 (1854); see also Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 110
(1806) (Parsons, J.).
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their fathers, who generally had no legal connection to them at all. 95 But in
Stanley v. Illinois, the Court took it as virtually axiomatic that the relationship
of children to a father who had never married their mother, nor otherwise
"legitimated" them, was covered by the "cardinal" due process right of parents
96
to care for and raise the children they create.
As of 1948, thirty states banned interracial marriages, and six states had
those bans in their state constitutions. Sixteen of those bans were still on the
books in 1967 when the U.S. Supreme Court said that miscegenation laws
violated the fundamental right to marry, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
As slaves, African-Americans had no right to family at all and could be
separated from partners, parents, and children at the whim of their "owners."
Needless to say, there was no American "history and tradition" of allowing
97
interracial marriage.
True, Loving was about race, the ultimate suspect classification. But the
Loving decision took care to say that it was independently based on both equal
protection, because the law used an impermissible race classification, and on
due process, because the restriction limited the exercise of the fundamental
right to marry. In Zablocki v. Redhail, eleven years later, the Court called
Loving its "leading decision" on "the right to marry" and explained that
"[a]lthough Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and
subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals."-98
Moreover, neither Zablocki itself nor Boddie v. Connecticut99 could have
been decided as they were if history and tradition dictated not just what is
protected by due process, but also who can exercise the rights it protects.
Zablocki was about a Wisconsin law that forbade remarriage after a divorce
unless the parent was current in his child support payments and had a court
order certifying the fact. The Court held that both requirements interfered with
95. See, e.g., Beckett v. State ex rel. Rothert, 30 N.E. 536 (Ind. App. 1892); Friesner v.
App. 297 (1884).
Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259 (N.J. Prerog. 1890); Glidden v. Nelson, 15 I11.
96. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Michael H. v. Gerald D. is not to the contrary. In

Michael H., five Justices said that a biological father could show a protected liberty interest
in his relationship to a child who was being raised by the husband of her mother. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132-36 (1989) (Stevens, J.), 136-157 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting for himself, Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.), 157-163 (White, J., dissenting for
himself and Brennan, J.).
97. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 & n.5 (1967). The Loving decision says that
16 states had laws against interracial marriage when it was decided, and that 14 more had
repealed theirs "over the past fifteen years." Actually, states began to eliminate their laws in
1948, four years earlier. See Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948). At least one of the
dissenters in Perez agreed with the Loving Court's count. See id. at 747 (Schenk, J.,
dissenting). The six states with constitutional bans were Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See also R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the
Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 855-6 (2004).

98. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
99. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-91; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the fundamental right to marry and were not justified by any sufficient
countervailing state interest. 100 Boddie was a challenge to a Connecticut law
that refused to waive mandatory filing fees for indigent people who wanted to
divorce. The Court also struck that law down as an impermissible interference
with the right to marry. 101
But we have no firmly rooted tradition of requiring that the government
allow either easy divorce or remarriage. England was, with a few rare
exceptions, a "divorceless" society until 1857. In southern states, divorce was
rare or nonexistent until the mid-nineteenth century. The northern states
allowed divorce for reasons such as abandonment, adultery, and "gross
misbehavior and wickedness," but it remained rare, and the only form of
consensual divorce was the collusive divorce designed to get around the law
02
when both parties wanted out of the relationship. 1
We may pride ourselves on a history and tradition of protecting freedom
from "bodily restraint" and say that this most basic freedom is at the "core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." We do not have a long history
and tradition, however, of recognizing that the mentally disabled have a right to
freedom from restraint. Nevertheless, in the end the Court had no difficulty
103
concluding that the Due Process Clause protects them as well.
But unlike the rest of modern substantive due process cases, Bowers did
draw a who line and say that a right fundamental to some Americans was
unavailable to others. 104 The Bowers Court was not about to limit the right of
privacy found in Griswold and Eisenstadt to certain acts and hold that the
"sacred precincts" of marital and non-marital bedrooms could now be searched
for evidence of sodomy (which, by the way, is exactly what happened to
Michael Hardwick). 105 Thus, it said the issue was not whether Americans had a
right to any form of non-procreative sexuality (or the one at hand), but was
instead "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy .. ".."106
The issue for the Court was whether gay people had the same right to
privacy that other Americans had. 10 7 So the Court had to come up with some
100. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-91.
101. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 371.
102. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179-184 (1973).

103. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (holding that the right
to freedom from restraint survives commitment just as it survives incarceration) with Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding constitutional forcible sterilization of the mentally
disabled) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1948) (holding unconstitutional to
forcibly sterilize some felons).
104. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
105. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated by 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
106. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.

107. The fundamental problem with this view of the case was that Georgia's law did
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way of explaining why the constitutional right to privacy was limited to
heterosexuals. Brushing aside its own precedents as not on point, the Court
turned to history to find the scope of the fundamental right. History, the Court
said, made it "obvious" that the Constitution did not "extend a fundamental
right to homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy." That conclusion followed,
the Court said, from the criminal proscriptions on sodomy, which made any
claim that the right was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ... at best, facetious." 108
There were two problems with this argument. First, the Court failed to give
any reason why, in this case alone, a fundamental right should be limited to
those who had historically been allowed to exercise it. Second, and as a
practical matter more serious, the "traditional" line the Court wanted to draw
did not exist in history at all. America had no tradition of outlawing
"homosexual sodomy." As the Lawrence Court pointed out, it was not until the
1970s that any state singled out same-sex intimacy in its criminal laws. 109 The
historical record simply gave the Court no basis for drawing the line at
heterosexuality. Worse, the historic practice of not applying sodomy statutes to
adults in their own homes-perhaps the best argument for Griswold and the
right to privacy it found-did not distinguish between gay people and straight
people. 110
Apart from the unexplained and, in a principled way, probably inexplicable
result in Bowers, it has seemed almost obvious to the Court that once the Court
has identified a protected right, the right belongs to everyone. Remember the
insistence in Eisenstadt that "if the right to privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
1
decision whether to bear or begat a child." 11
Still, if Bowers was flawed because it offered no theoretical justification
for limiting a fundamental right to some Americans, there ought to be a
theoretical justification for insisting that the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause are the liberties of all Americans and not just those who had

not say that homosexuals could not commit sodomy. Georgia said no one could. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (2004). The Court simply ignores that detail and says that Georgia's law
was about disapproval of "homosexual sodomy." See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
108. Id. at 190-94.
109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-572 (2003).
110. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (explaining that in postRevolutionary America, laws about sex were never invoked against couples, straight or gay,
who were intimate in their own homes). The failure to apply these laws to conduct facially
encompassed within them powerfully suggests a widespread understanding that private
sexuality was beyond the reach of the law. That widespread understanding may be the best
justification for Griswold's holding that private sexuality is implicitly protected as a basic
liberty under the Due Process Clause. But, of course, that history suggests the understanding,
and hence the right, belonged to all adults, not just heterosexuals.
111. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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them historically. There is. The two great principles upon which this nation was
founded are liberty and equality. 112 They are not in conflict-at least not as
they are understood in American law-and due process should not vindicate
one at the expense of the other.'1 3 Others will have to figure out why the
protection of life and liberty made it from the Declaration of Independence into
the Bill of Rights, while the cherished notion that all men are created equal did
not-at least not in so many words. Maybe equality was one of the basic
"natural" rights to which the Ninth Amendment refers. Maybe the politics of
slavery and union made using the word "equality" too much of a hot button.14
But perhaps the most compelling explanation is that equality is implicit in due
process itself. The most basic component of due process, the rule of law, very
much embodies the notion of equal justice and a single rule of law for all. That
would certainly be consistent with the Court's notion that discrimination can be
a violation of due process, and, most recently, its notion that the equality
requirement implicit in due process is indistinguishable from the equality
15
guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. 1
Certainly the Lawrence Court seemed to think equality was a central
element of due process. In a somewhat unusual passage, the Court explained
why it chose to rest its decision on the Due Process Clause instead of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court said it was worried that an equal protection ruling
might bring about two undesirable results: first, that a law which applied to gay
and straight couples might be thought valid, and second, that the stigma of
Texas's law would remain. Either of those things, the Court said, would be "an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and private spheres."'16 The fear that an equal protection decision would
continue to allow discrimination against gay people led the Court to strike the
law down on due process grounds. That was constitutionally appropriate, the
Court explained, because "[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty
112. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."); see also
President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) ("Fourscore and seven
years ago our forefathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.").
113. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
114. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION, 136-

173, 267-283 (1988).
115. On the Court's evolving attitude toward equality and due process, compare
Boiling, 347 U.S. at 497 (while equal protection and due process are not interchangeable ,
discrimination can be so arbitrary as to violate due process) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 93 (1976) (equality requirements of due process and equal protection are the same).
116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). The parties took some pains to
show the Court that facially "neutral" sodomy laws had in fact been used in all sorts of ways
to discriminate against gay people. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties
Union at 7-17, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
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are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances
both interests." 117 The Court decided on the basis of the Due Process Clause
because a due process decision would serve the constitutional interest in
equality and here, the Court thought, would in practice serve that constitutional
interest in equality more effectively than would an equality-based decision.
Still, if Lawrence is a straightforward application of the existing Griswold
right, why did it seem so clear to some of the Justices at the time that Griswold
would not apply to homosexuality? In his famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
Justice Harlan wrote:
Thus, I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest
are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced. So much has
been explicitly recognized in acknowledging the State's rightful concern for
its people's moral welfare. But not to discriminate between what is involved in
this case and either the traditional offenses against good morals or crimes
which, though they may be committed anywhere, happen to have been
committed or concealed in118the home, would entirely misconceive the
argument that is being made.
Justice Goldberg effectively adopted these words in his concurring opinion
four years later in Griswold.119 Is the evolution from Griswold to Lawrence an
example of the kind of evolving notions of due process that drive the historical
120
purists to distraction?
Maybe, but more likely, it is an example of our evolving notions of what it
means to be a human being. To return to an example, it seemed perfectly plain
to Oliver Wendell Holmes that forcibly sterilizing someone who was mentally
disabled did not violate due process. At one time, public officials saw nothing
wrong with confining for years mentally disabled individuals who posed no
threat to anyone. And of course, there are the more obvious examples. At one
time, due process was no bar to treating African Americans as property. Indeed,
the Court said that when the government decided a slave was no longer
property, that violated due process. Those ideas changed because our ideas of
12 1
what it means to be human changed.
At one time, American lawyers thought of intimacy with another person of
the same sex as just one bad choice that anyone was capable of making-a bad
choice like a lawyer deciding to go along with a fraudulent accounting practice.
This concept of sexual acts as being simply what a person does, and not a
reflection of an important part of personality, probably reflects the pre-

117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
118. 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965). Oddly enough, in his own
opinion concurring in the Griswoldjudgment, Justice Harlan did not either make the point
again or even allude to what he had said about homosexuality in Poe. Id. at 499-502.
120. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
121. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927);
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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twentieth century understanding that sexuality was not an importantly distinct
or defining part of human personality. In any event, it seems clear that after
World War II, the cultural notion that there is a group of people who find
fulfillment in primary relationships with members of the same sex began to
emerge. I say began to emerge, because by 1965 the idea that there were gay
people who built primary intimate relationships with members of the same sex
122
was just beginning to gain recognition.
The passage from Griswold to Lawrence is one way to map the arc of the
gay rights movement in America. In 1965, three of the most progressive
Justices saw homosexuality as "promiscuity or misconduct." Thirty-eight years
later, a majority of the Court saw it as a "personal relationship" parallel to the
intimate relationships of heterosexuals and parallel to marriages. Once it is
clear that being gay or lesbian is not about giving in to an urge for a different
but dangerous taste, like com whiskey, but is instead a different way of
building a life-once it is plain that homosexuality is the right way for some to
build a fulfilling existence-Lawrence follows Griswold as day follows night.
The movement has been about changing the understanding of what it means to
123
be gay and of how being gay changes the way human beings live.
Lawrence itself sees the progression from Griswold not as an evolution in
due process, but as an evolution in human understanding. In the very last
passage, Justice Kennedy tells us:
[The authors of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom. 124

Time has taught us that much of what we once "knew" about gay people
was wrong, just as time taught us that immemorial "truths" about women,
Asians, black and brown people, the Irish, Italians, and Jews, and others were
not true. 125 Time has taught us that gay people are people and are thus entitled
to constitutional protections the Court found almost forty years ago for
heterosexuals.

122. DAVID M. HALPERN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY
BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE (1990).

(1990);

ALAN

123. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99
(Goldberg, J., concurring). There is at least a small irony here in that the key to the
constitutional right which will make assimilation easier was to establish a basic difference.
124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
125. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,

1860-1925 (198 1); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
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Ill.

CODA: THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY & MARRIAGE

The Lawrence decision arrived just over two weeks after the Ontario Court
of Appeals ruled that same-sex couples could no longer be excluded from
marriage. 126 The Lawrence opinions all address the marriage issue in one way
or another. The majority is studiously noncommittal. When explaining how the
Texas law does more than make an act a crime, the Court observes: "[Sodomy
laws] seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals."' 127 In closing, the Court again says that it has
nothing to say about marriage, because the issue is not before it. 128
Justice Scalia will have none of it; "Do not believe it," he cries. The
opinion of the Court "dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has
permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual
12 9
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concemed."'
Does it? Not really, because there was never a "structure of constitutional
law" of that sort. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage could never
have withstood equal protection or due process analysis fairly applied. But
Lawrence did take away the illusion of a principled basis for upholding the
exclusion, and in so doing, it has made federal constitutional attacks on the
30
exclusion a real possibility. 1
The most obvious constitutional problem with the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage is that it interferes with the federal constitutional right to
marry. Unlike most aspects of "protected liberty" due process, which often look
like Justice Brandeis's proverbial "right to be let alone,"' 13 1 the right to marry is
an affirmative right to receive very important benefits from the government. As
mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has used it to strike down laws against
interracial marriage, laws banning marriage by prisoners, laws that made poor
people pay fees to be divorced, and laws that said parents could not remarry if
they were behind in child support. 13 2 Loving, the interracial marriage case,
suggests that the Due Process Clause requires limitations on the right to marry
to meet the highest constitutional standards, the "fundamental rights," strict

126. Halpern v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161 (Ont. Ct. App. 2003).
127. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
128. Id. at 578. Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion makes it fairly clear that
she does not think laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage would violate the equal
protection analysis she would have used to strike down the Texas law in Lawrence.
129. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

130. To say that federal constitutional attacks on the marriage exclusion are now
possible is not the same thing as to say that they are, in the short term, a good idea.
131. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
132. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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scrutiny test. 133 Zablocki, the "deadbeat dad" case, says limitations on who can
marry have to meet a similarly exacting strict scrutiny equal protection test.134
Defenders of the exclusion never argue that it can meet either test, for
reasons that will become apparent. Instead they insist that while there may be a
right to marry, there is no right for same-sex couples to marry, and they point to
the fact that only one American state has ever allowed it.135 But this is the
who/what protected liberty issue which I discussed earlier. The Court's
"protected liberty" due process cases look to history to decide what liberties are
protected, but not who gets to exercise them. As I pointed out earlier, if the
Court restricted a protected liberty to those who traditionally possessed it, many
of the Court's "protected liberty" cases-including at least three of its major
marriage cases-would have come out the other way. And not incidentally, the
doctrine would ignore the constitutional guarantee of equality, in itself a
36
cardinal due process principle. 1
Bowers v. Hardwick137 could never have provided a serious constitutional
justification for limiting the fundamental right to marry to heterosexuals
because Bowers had no serious constitutional justification for limiting the right
to autonomy to heterosexuals. But Justice Scalia's Lawrence dissent was right
to a degree; Bowers may never have provided a principled reason for limiting
the right to marry, but with Bowers gone, there is no longer even an excuse for
limiting the right. But while Bowers may be gone, we should not forget it. The
Court showed us in Bowers that under the right circumstances, it was willing to
use raw power to make a case come out as it wished, without regard to its prior
cases or constitutional theories. The Court could use that same raw power to
limit the right to marry.
If it does not, recognition that the fundamental right to marry belongs to
gay people is fatal to the exclusion. For even apart from the fundamental right
to marry, most explanations of the exclusion are either "irrational," as several
courts have said, 138 or face a heightened scrutiny review (that the explanations
cannot pass) for other reasons. Those who defend the exclusion have only
offered three reasonably conceivable purposes for keeping gay couples out of

133. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
134. Zablocki, 474 U.S. at 388.
135. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion at 25-30, Samuels v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Health (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (No. 1967-04); Defendants-Appellees's Brief at 40-46,
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. 08860); Appellee's
Brief at 62-73, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032).
136. See supra notes 103-120 and accompanying text, where the text explains that,
apart from Bowers, the Court has never limited basic liberties implicitly protected by the
Due Process Clause to those who traditionally got to exercise them. Limiting due process
rights in that manner would offend the core concept of equality implicit in due process itself.
137. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruledby Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
138. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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marriage: tradition; the creation and raising of children; and most recently, the
possibility that heterosexuals will stop marrying if same-sex couples start. 139 In
making these arguments, these individuals typically ignore the obvious, real
purpose of marriage: making the law reflect the reality of what is, for most
adults, one of the most central relationships in their lives.
The critical thing to do with all three of these rationales is to spin them
out-to ask precisely how it is that excluding same-sex couples from marriage
might be thought to achieve the suggested aim. Like most rationalizations for
prejudice, they all appear to have something to do with the subject, in this case
marriage, but in the end prove to have little or nothing to do with even a
conceivably legitimate reason for discrimination, in this case keeping same-sex
couples out of marriage.
As I mentioned earlier, the cardinal principle of equal protection is that a
classification can never be its own justification. If a state can be said to treat
people "equally" though it treats them differently, it must be because it can
fairly be said (or thought on a rational basis) that treating them differently will
achieve some legitimate aim of the law (or a conceivable aim on a rational
basis). As the Court put it in Romer v. Evans, the classification has to promote a
purpose "independent" of the classification itself. 140 And it is on this cardinal
principle that "tradition" as a legitimate purpose comes to grief.
Saying that we want to draw the line at opposite-sex couples because we
have long drawn the line there is not much different than saying we want to
draw the line at opposite-sex couples because we want to draw it there now.
Tradition is not a purpose independent of the line, but rather a purpose that
embodies the line, albeit with time added. But the addition of time cannot
possibly, without more, be a sufficient independent purpose. If it were, every
classification would survive rational basis review as long as it were not a new
invention. A bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group, to use the
language of Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 14 1 would be a sufficient
purpose as long as the group's unpopularity were not a new thing.
I am not suggesting that maintaining tradition is not a legitimate reason for
having a law. For due process purposes, it doubtless is. Morality and aesthetics
are legitimate purposes.1 42 Surely tradition may be a legitimate purpose as well.
But equal protection demands that our traditions, like our moralities and our
aesthetics, be neutral. To uphold a "tradition" of treating one group of
Americans differently, we must have something more than a habit of doing so.

139. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion at 13-22, Samuels v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Health (2004) (No. 1967-04); Defendants-Appellees's Brief at 109-128, Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (No. 08860); Appellee's Brief at 41-60,
Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194 (1999) (No. 98-32).
140. 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); see also Coles, supra note 22, at 1434.
141. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
142. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 102-103 (1954).
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We must have some plausible argument that doing so has some consequence
(or conceivably could), which achieves (or conceivably might achieve) a
legitimate aim. 143 We tend to think, at least generally, that traditions are good.
But we have to demand a little more from a "tradition" of exclusion and ask
what independent good that kind of tradition achieves if it is to be anything
other than a classification for its own durable sake.
That brings us to the first of the "tradition plus" arguments: creating and
raising children. There are two variations on the "children" argument. In one,
the argument is that the stability marriage gives to adult relationships creates a
good framework for raising children. That is certainly plausible; indeed, it is
probably true. But it hardly explains how excluding gay people serves this aim.
Gay people have and raise children too. How are children helped, in any
conceivable way, by denying marriage to same-sex couples? It does nothing for
the children of heterosexual couples, and, if marriage is good for children, the
exclusion is harmful to the children of same-sex couples. That the stability of
marriage is good for children is a plausible (if incomplete) explanation of
marriage; it is not an explanation for why same-sex couples are excluded.
Another variation tries to make a connection between children and the
exclusion. This argument theorizes that couples made up of men and women do
a better job raising children than do same-sex couples. Thus, excluding samesex couples from marriage serves the supposed purpose of promoting the
raising of children by keeping out those who are not as good at parenting.
Although this claim at least provides a rational link between the exclusion and
the goal, the connection it provides requires heightened scrutiny. The "link" is
based on the assumption that gay people as a group are less capable of being
good parents than heterosexuals. Unsubstantiated assumptions of group
incapacity are simply not permissible purposes for equal protection. They have
to be supported. 14 4 Even more critically, people have a constitutionally
protected right to have and raise children who are legally theirs. 145 To actively
discourage such activity by denying some couples all of the legal protections of
marriage, the state would require more than a rational basis. The state would
have prove, at a minimum, that gay people are not as good at parenting and
probably also that they pose some harm to their children. 146 But there is no
143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-83 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. This is the holding of the Cleburne case, and, a bit less clearly, of Moreno.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 536-38. In
Cleburne, the Court said the "fears" and "negative attitudes" of neighbors, "unsubstantiated
by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding," were not a permissible
justification for discrimination. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. The Court of Appeals opinion
makes it clearer that the "negative attitudes" took the form of claims that mentally disabled
people would disrupt the peace of the neighborhood, and engage in "dangerous" activities.
Cleburne Living Ctr. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 201 (5th Cir. 1984).
145. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1948).

146. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). What the
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reliable evidence of this at all. 14 7 Instead, the best the defenders of the
exclusion can do is to say that the proof that gay people are as good at
parenting as heterosexuals is inconclusive. 148 But you do not need to prove
your merit to keep a constitutional right; the state needs to prove your lack of
49
merit to take it away. 1
The idea that heterosexuals will stop getting married if same-sex couples
marry is new, advanced not with logic but supposedly with empirical evidence.
The idea, mainly pushed by Stanley Kurtz, is based on statistics from Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden, which have had registered same-sex partnerships since
1989, 1993, and 1994, respectively. 150 In all three countries, marriage numbers
are down and cohabitation is up, as are the number of couples bearing and
raising children outside of marriage.
Unfortunately for Kurtz's thesis, all three trends apparently long predate
the registered partnerships (a fact which he sometimes grudgingly admits).
Kurtz suggests that ending the exclusion was accepted in these three countries
because couples were having children without getting married and that this
made it more plausible to see marriage as being about the couple and not just
about raising children. I suppose it is remotely, conceivably possible to think
that the decision of some heterosexuals to raise children without marriage led
people to see that marriage was not necessarily about raising children, although
neither Kurtz nor anyone else has offered any evidence that it did or that people
did not see that rather obvious fact long ago. But this hypothesis makes ending
the exclusion the result of declining marriage rates, not its cause. Kurtz tries to
solve that problem by suggesting that the existence of married same-sex
couples will "lock in" the notion that marriage is not just about raising children
and over time will make it even more unlikely that heterosexuals will marry.
However, he is unable to suggest any reason why this would be so-any reason
at all why the existence of same-sex married couples will keep heterosexual
couples away. 151 The only one that comes to mind-that heterosexuals do not
government must do to "substantiate" a negative assumption is far less clear. That is
irrelevant here since, as noted in infra note 148 and accompanying text, the most a defender
of the exclusion can do is say that the overwhelming evidence that sexual orientation has no
connection to the ability to parent is not conclusive.
147. J. Stacey & T. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66
AM. Soc. REV. 159, 176 (2001).
148. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman,
J., dissenting), 997-99 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
149. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
150. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY. STANDARD, Vol. 9,
No. 20, Feb. 2004; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 997-99 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
151. Kurtz, supra note 150; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Nordic Bliss?
Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, SINGLE-SEX MARRIAGE

(2004), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4

(last visited Mar. 16, 2005) (critiquing Kurtz's statistics). Timothy Dailey of the Family
Research Council suggests a solution to Kurtz's problem. Heterosexual marriages will be
"devalued" by the existence of married same-sex couples, much as a significant number of
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want to be a part of an institution that gay people belong to-is not adequate
52
for equal protection purposes. 1
The exclusion fares no better if we look to the obvious, real purpose of
marriage laws. One of the two untenable propositions that are often taken very
seriously in the marriage debate is the idea that the law of marriage is a bundle
of privileges designed to induce people to marry. However, almost no one
marries to get the advantages of the legal status. People marry because they
want to share their lives with each other. The urge to go through life with
someone else is a fundamental human desire, not a legal construct. Marriage
laws do not induce the relationship; they reflect it. We treat married couples as
a single economic unit because that is how they function. We identify a spouse
as the person most likely to know a person's wishes in a medical emergency
because it is a reasonable assumption. Marriage laws are the legal reflection of
153
the reality of the way committed couples live.
Like the "child" rationale, the idea that the purpose of marriage laws is to
have the law accurately reflect the relationships of committed couples is a
plausible explanation of marriage. It is no explanation of the exclusion at all
unless you assume that same-sex couples are different, that they don't have the
kind of relationships that heterosexual couples do. But that would be another
assumption of incapacity that would call for proof. 154 Given the incredible
variety of heterosexual relationships, all of which qualify for marriage, it seems
a difficult-or rather, impossible-one to prove.
Having covered the modern laws that exclude same-sex couples from
marriage, let us turn to the old laws-laws which were passed when it
doubtless had not occurred to anyone that same-sex couples even existed.
These were probably laws of inclusion, laws that meant to take in everyone
who might be in a couple, and also those who might as a couple have and raise
children. As an inclusion from another time, the line makes rudimentary-and
thus probably rational basis-sense both in terms of couples and children.
Some of those laws are not explicitly gendered, so one way to respond to
belated recognition that same-sex couples do exist would be simply to let them
marry. Typically, though, courts say that these laws do not allow same-sex
marriage because the legislature did not intend to allow it, or would not have if

counterfeit $20 bills devalue currency. Timothy Dailey, The Slippery Slope of Same-Sex
Marriage, Family Research Council (2005), available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=

BC04CO2 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). The underlying assumption-that the relationships of
gay people are unworthy-at a minimum requires heightened scrutiny.
152. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
153. The other untenable idea is that marriage as an institution is mostly about raising
children. Certainly marriage plays an important role in creating and raising children. But the
relationship of two individuals is at the center of what marriage is about. Kurtz and the
Family Research Council may want to consider the ceremonies used for marriage. I believe
these ceremonies may be reinforcing the idea that the couple is at the center of marriage.
154. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); supra note 141.
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the idea had come up. 155 Interpreted that way, the laws are not laws of
inclusion, so they have the same problem that the modem laws have. And laws
reenacted after the legislature is plainly aware that same-sex couples do exist
156
seem to me to become exclusions as well.
Tempting though it might be to decide the constitutionality of the marriage
exclusion with a rational basis analysis, it really should be analyzed under the
right to marry. Since the right to marry applies to gay people, the right to marry
is the appropriate analysis. The exclusion cannot help but fail a right to marry
analysis. Under heightened scrutiny, it does not matter whether the exclusion
was written as an inclusion. Tradition is plainly inadequate-we had a tradition
of banning interracial marriage. 157 The "gays are bad parents" argument would
need the proof it does not have.
The fact that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is
unconstitutional does not necessarily mean it is good idea to bring lawsuits to
encourage courts to strike it down. If it is a necessary conclusion that we use
history to decide the what but not the who of protected rights, Lawrence is the
first case that comes close to explicitly acknowledging the idea and discussing
it. When the law is this underdeveloped, it is quite possible for hostile or even
overly cautious judges to find ways around applying the Constitution fairly.
Look at Bowers v. Hardwick.158 Whenever you have to spin out a rationale to
show that it does not make sense, you run the risk that the Court will just go
with its instinct and uphold the law. Look at the last rational basis part of
Bowers, which, to support a who limitation in a law that the law did not have,
postulates a who driven purpose to the public. 159 Besides, it is notoriously
difficult to get past the idea that, fairly applied, anything passes rational basis
review. 160
Moreover, losing at the Supreme Court might not be the worst problem for
those who want to end the exclusion. Winning a Supreme Court decision that
required that every state allow same-sex couples to marry could well put

155. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 951-53 (Mass. 2003);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868-70 (Vt. 1999).
156. Consider legislative districts in Alabama. When drawn in 1900, they may have
reflected the legislature's (accurate) perception of where people lived, and thus would have
been constitutional. But as population shifted (shifts obvious to the legislature) and the
legislature held to the same lines, they became unconstitutional. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 533 (1964).
157. As explained supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text, over 60% of the states
banned interracial marriage until the mid-twentieth century, and until slavery was abolished,

African-Americans were not permitted to marry anyone in much of the United States.
158. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
159. Id. at 196.
160. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-2, 16-3,

1439-1446 (2d ed., 1988). Although Professor Tribe says the rational basis test amounts to
"a strong presumption of constitutionality," he labels virtually every instance of the Court
striking down a law under rational basis as "covertly heightened scrutiny." Id.
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enough steam behind a proposal to amend the Federal Constitution to exclude
same-sex couples from marriage in every state-enough steam, that is, to send
it out to the states.
The courts have a somewhat undeserved reputation for bringing change to
society, for making it more equal and fair. But they are far better at striking
down attempts to fence those seeking change out of the political process and at
making recalcitrant parts of society accept change that has already come to
most of the country. Thirty states banned interracial marriage when the
California Supreme Court struck down that state's law. 161 Only sixteen states
still had bans in place nineteen years later when the Supreme Court struck
down all laws prohibiting interracial marriage. 162 Twenty-four states had
"sodomy" laws when Bowers was decided. Thirteen states did when Lawrence
was decided. 163 Roe v. Wade 16 4 may be the great exception to the rule, but it is
an exception that proves the crucial point: you cannot make enduring change in
America unless you can persuade people to accept it.
Lawrence, fairly applied, makes the end of the marriage exclusion
constitutionally inevitable, unless the Court abandons its approach to the
protection of implicit rights or creates an unprincipled exception like it did in
Bowers. But the legacy of Roe says that Lawrence is likely to take down the
exclusion after most states have already abandoned it. That does not mean
Lawrence is unimportant to the marriage debate, just that Lawrence is far more
important for the political question it put to America than for the eventual legal
consequence of its holding. If same-sex relationships cannot be made a crime,
Lawrence asks, then shouldn't they be recognized by society? In the immediate
wake of Lawrence, public opinion polls about same-sex relationships, marriage,
and civil unions fluctuated wildly. That is because questions that had been
abstract until then-questions about the proper place of gay people in
American society-were suddenly real.
The Court posed the question. It is now up to the political process to supply
the answer.
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